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FINANCING PRIVATE ENERGY
PROJECTS IN THE THIRD
WORLD

WILLIAM M. STELWAGON*

As developing nations struggle to modernize and industrialize, their demand for infrastructure development has grown at a
staggering rate.' To modernize, these nations must build new
roads, plumbing and sewage systems, and provide services that
developed nations often take for granted. In particular, developing nations have experienced drastic increases in demand for energy production.3 This demand for new power generation has
J.D., 1996, St. John's University School of Law; Managing Editor
of Volume 70
of the St. John'sLaw Review.
' See Patrick D. Harder, Infrastructure Privatization in South Asia, 15 APR
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 34, 34 (1995) ("The explosive growth of the economies of the
countries making up South Asia, with the corresponding mass migration of the rural
population into the cities in search of employment, has resulted in an overloading of
the often antiquated infrastructure systems found throughout South Asia.").
2 See id. (describing third-world infrastructure needs as including
highways,
railways, safe water supplies, fiber-optic cabling, telecommunications systems, deepsea ports, airports, and electric power generation).
See id. ("Particularly acute is the growing demand for electricity in the region.
Brownouts and other electrical failures are commonplace in many of the fastgrowing cities of developing South Asia .... [Tihe need for electricity generation
plants has reached crisis levels in some areas."); ENRON GLOBAL POWER AND
PIPELINES LLC, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1995) (stating that to meet increased power
demand in Philippines, total installed capacity must increase from 7,900 megawatts
in 1993 to 11,200 megawatts in 1988 and 25,000 megawatts in 2005, and that in India power needs exceed availability by approximately 22 percent); World Bank
Backs Private Power Scheme, POWER ASIA, Jan. 22. 1996, at 13 (asserting that
Bangladesh needs to increase power generation 1,200 megawatts by year 2000).
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quickly outpaced the ability of Third World nations to fund such
development.4 For this reason, governments of developing nations have begun to allow private foreign investors to finance,
operate, and own energy infrastructure projects. 5 Foreign investors, in turn, have rushed to meet this demand.
Private• power7 generation projects are arising throughout the
developing world. For example, Enron Development Corpora4 See Robert Thorton Smith, Submission and
Evaluation of Proposals for Private Power Generation Projects in Developing Countries, in PROJECT FINANCING
FROM DOMESTIC TO INTERNATIONAL: BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN

DEVELOPING MARKETS 1995 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. A4-4460, 1995) ("The private sector can be an important source of financ-

ing for power, a factor that is especially relevant for the financially pressed public
sectors of many developing countries.").
Authorities project that Asian countries will require $3 trillion for infrastructure
development over the next ten to fifteen years. Harder, supra note 1, at 34. Despite
booming economies in South Asia, these countries remain incapable of financing development projects. Id at 35.
This process has been called "privatization." See John J. Beardsworth, Jr., Negotiating Power PurchaseAgreements: Fundamentalsfor Risk Allocation and Dispute Resolution, in PROJECT FINANCING FROM DOMESTIC TO INTERNATIONAL:
BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING MARKETS 1995 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4460, 1995) ("[Many ...

nations, including developing nations and the nations of Central Europe, are beginning to see private investment as a valuable means for promoting efficiency in

power production. The efficiency will in turn raise standards of living and build a
more attractive environment for economic development."); see also Harder, supra
note 1, at 34 ("Privatized infrastructure projects appeal to the governments of developing countries in South Asia because such schemes reduce or eliminate the need
for governments to use existing public funds or to borrow funds from traditional infrastructure lenders ...by transferring the funding obligations to private companies."); Mission Energy in for the Long Haul, POWER ASIA, Feb. 19, 1996, at 6
[hereinafter Long Haul] (noting that California-based Mission Energy Company

contracted with government for $2.5 billion "BOO" power plant).

' ENRON GLOBAL POWER AND PIPELINES LLC, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1995)
("The demand for energy infrastructure grows daily around the world where economics are springing to life with an unexpected sense of urgency. Investors are signaling a desire to participate in these changes by identifying investments that provide predictable international earnings for the long term."). Enron Global Power and
Pipelines ("EPP") has further stated that "[als the need for reliable and abundant
energy escalates, ...
(EPP) is providing the link between investors who want predictable international earnings and the emerging markets in need of secure capital
commitments and technical expertise for energy infrastructure." Id. at 2-3.
7 See, e.g., ENRON GLOBAL POWER AND PIPELINES LLC, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT
(1995) (discussing fast growing energy markets in India, Philippines, Guatemala,
and Argentina); Long Haul, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing Paiton energy project in
Indonesia); Why Hydro Hopes to Sate Thirsty Guangdong, POWER ASIA, Sept. 4,
1995, at 4 (discussing hydroelectric power plants on Pearl River as generating power
needed to drive industrial take off in Guangdong, China); Moves Afoot to Take Heat
Out of Dabhol Row, POWER ASIA, June 26, 1995, at 3 [hereinafter Dabhol Row]
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tion, a subsidiary of Enron Corporation, is participating in the
development of energy projects in Argentina, Guatemala, the
Philippines, Columbia, India, and China. s Most notably, Enron
developed the 2015-megawatt Dabhol Project in Maharashtra,
India.9 Mission Energy Company, a subsidiary of SCE Corporation, is also actively participating in the development of power
projects in the Third World. 10 While Mission's best known project is the 1230-megawatt Paiton Power Project in Indonesia,
Mission is also involved with projects in India, the Philippines,
and China." Similarly, CMS Generation, a subsidiary of CMS
Energy Corporation, is an active participant in the development
of private power projects in the Third World. 12 CMS has invested
in projects that total more than 9800-megawatts in Argentina,
the Philippines, and India."
If such projects are to succeed, several types of risk associated with private power projects in developing countries must be
addressed. 14 These risks fall into three basic categories: commercial, political, and force majeure. 15 Private power projects
are typically financed on a project basis, as opposed to balancesheet financing. 16 Under project basis financing, investors real(discussing Dabhol power project in Maharashtra, India).
TENRON CORP., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
9Id.
'0 SCE CORP., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1995) ("Mission Energy is positioned to
provide the power generation that developing countries need to continue their economic growth."); Long Haul, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing Mission's leadership role
in development of Paiton Project in Indonesia); Financing Clearedfor Mission and
Co.'s Paiton Project, POWER ASIA, Apr. 28, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter FinancingCleared
for Mission] (same).
" SCE CORP., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
12 CMS ENERGY CORP., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
1 Id.
'4 See, e.g., Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 29 ("Be warned, then, that no private
power project will be able to attract the necessary financing unless its risks are effectively accounted for and allocated and unless mechanisms are in place to resolve
disputes fairly and with dispatch and at a reasonable cost."); John G. Manuel,
Common ContractualRisk Allocations in InternationalPower Projects, 1996 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 37, 59 (1996) ("Over time, the [private power] project participants who
are more accurate than their competitors in identifying and allocating the risks associated with their respective power projects will be more likely to succeed.").
'5 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 36; see also Harder, supra note 1, at 36-38
(dividing commercial risk into development/feasibility risk, construction risk, operation risk, and financial risk); Manuel, supra note 14, at 42 (stating that project
agreements usually categorize commercial risks as construction risks, operating
risks, fuel risks, market risks, and political risks).
' See Harder, supra note 1, at 10 ("[Tlhe availability of project finance is determined by the merits of the project rather than the credit of the borrower.");
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17
ize a return on their investments only from project cash flows.
Project financing is typically non-recourse, meaning investors
may secure against project assets but not against assets of the
developer or the host nation.'8 The non-recourse nature of investment in private power projects necessitates proper mitigation and allocation of all types of risk associated with the project.1 9 As a general proposition, a given risk should be borne
by
it. 20
control
to
suited
best
is
that
transaction
a
to
the party
Part I of this article will examine the basic structure of, and
identify the relevant parties to, a private power project in a developing country. Part II will examine the different types of risk
associated with private power projects and suggest which parties
are in the best position to bear such risks. Part III will examine
the relationship between proper risk allocation and project access to international financing. Part IV will suggest steps that
developing countries may take to mitigate risk, facilitate access
to international financial markets, and further encourage private
developers to pursue projects within such countries. Finally,
Part V will discuss the social costs that a developing country
may face when implementing project risk reduction measures.

Smith, supra note 4, at 195 ("Established electrical utilities finance new projects on
the basis of their credit standing in capital markets, a method called balance-sheet
financing. Private power projects, however, are usually undertaken with project financing.").
17 See Smith, supra note 4, at 195 ("With project financing,
lenders and investors look to the project's cash flow for repayment of principal and interest, and for
returns on the investment.").
18 Harder, supra note 1, at 40 ("The basic principal of project finance is that the
project lenders look primarily to the project itself, particularly the projected output
and revenues, rather than to the credit support of the sponsors or the value of the
physical assets involved, as the source of repayment of the financing. Lenders,
therefore, place substantial reliance on the project's performance."); Funds and
Fundamentals: Securing Sound Financing for New Electric Power Projects
(Privatizationin Latin America), LATIN FINANCE, Jan. 1, 1995, at 22 ("Nonrecourse
or limited recourse project financing is financing in which the principal or only
source of debt repayment is the cash flow generated by the power station."); see also
Mark J. Riedy, Legal and PracticalConsiderationsin StructuringBusiness Transactions in India for the Conference Entitled: India Power, 3 CARDOZO J. INTL & COMP.
L. 313, 318 (1995) ("[Tlhe major projects in India will proceed on a 'project finance'
basis, i.e., non-recourse finance secured by the project assets (physical equipment,
contracts, cash flow, etc.) and not primarily by the creditworthiness of the project
sponsors or borrowing entities as is required in traditional finance.").
'9 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 30 (asserting that one main reason for lack
of progress of private power projects in developing countries is inability to obtain
financing due to poor risk allocation); Smith, supra note 4, at 218 (same).
20 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 37; Manuel, supra note 14, at 38; Smith,
supra note 4, at 218.
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I. THE STRUCTURE OF A TYPICAL PRIVATE POWER PROJECT
The typical private power project in a developing country involves the participation of the host nation, a private developer,
investors or lenders, and a multilateral investment institution.
Because the host nation is unable or unwilling to finance energy
infrastructure development with public funds, it accepts bids
from private developers. 21 Developing countries have found privatization of power generation to be an attractive option because
private developers are often efficient in terms of construction
and maintenance of the project, willing to accept the risks associated with construction and operation, and willing to provide financing for the project. 22 The developer, on the other hand, is interested in the project because of the high profit potential
23
associated with investing in emerging Third World markets.
Generally, private power projects take one of two forms.
First, the project might be conducted on a Build-Own-Operate
basis ("BOO"). 24 In such transactions, the developer builds the
power plant inside the host country, owns the plant, and sells
the power generated by the plant's operation to the public power
utility of the host nation.2 5 Second, the project might be conducted on a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer basis ("BOOT"). 26 In a
BOOT project, the developer also builds, owns, and operates the

21

See Harder, supra note 1, at 35.

Despite the attention being given to the booming economies and stock
markets in South Asia, the financial systems of developing countries such
as Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are incapable of marshaling the
funds needed to fund required infrastructure projects. Most South Asian
countries simply cannot provide all the capital required to meet their vast
infrastructure and building needs.
Compounding this lack of government funds to fully satisfy the basic infrastructure needs of the region is the conflicting demand by local citizens
that government funds be used to support more social services and other
similar programs. Such funding leaves even less money for infrastructure
construction.
Id.; see Smith, supra note 4, at 190.
2 Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 30; Smith, supra note 4, at 192; see also New
Challenges for BOT in Asia, POWER AsIA, Feb. 19, 1996, at 4 ("According to the
World Bank, many believe the private sector, operating in a competitive environment, can improve efficiency both in terms of investments and operations.").
2' Harder, supra note 1, at 35; see ENRON GLOBAL POWER & PIPELINES LLC,
1994 ANNuAL REPORT (1995).
2A Harder, supra note 1, at 36; Smith, supra note 4, at 190.
25 Harder, supra note 1, at 36; Smith, supra note 4, at 190.
2' Harder, supra note 1, at 36; Smith, supra note 4, at 190.
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power plant inside the host nation. 27 A BOOT project differs
from a BOO project, however, in that a BOOT project ultimately
requires the developer to transfer
ownership of the power plant
8
to the public power utility.
The core document to any private energy project is the
power purchase agreement ("PPA"). This document creates the
revenue stream against which financing is obtained and from
which investment returns are realized. 29 The PPA is a contract
between the private developer and the host nation or its power
utility that defines the obligations of the parties and provides incentives and penalties designed to ensure performance associated with construction and operation of the project. 30 Under the
PPA, the power utility pays for the energy generated by the project in a two-tier pricing system. First, the utility must make capacity payments, which are pegged to a plant's dependable generation capacity and are paid as long as the plant is capable of
such capacity, whether or not the plant is ever called upon to
dispatch that much power.3 ' Capacity payments are designed to
compensate
the onstucton
developer
for the
fixed costs associated with
projct
ad
. 32
project construction and operation.
Second, the utility must
make energy payments which vary depending on the amount of
energy actually delivered to the utility.33 Energy payments are
designed to protect both the developer and the utility from fluctuating fuel and operation costs. 34
The developer is responsible for securing financing for the
project. 35 This can be accomplished through any of the traditional methods of raising capital, including debt and equity offerings, and loans from commercial banks.36 Because of the non27

Harder, supra note 1, at 36; Smith, supra note 4, at 190.
supra note 1, at 36; Smith, supra note 4, at 190.

28 Harder,

29 Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 32; Smith, supra note 4, at 226.

'9 Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 32; Smith, supra note 4, at 226-27.
3 Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 37-38; Smith, supra note 4, at 210-13.
32 Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 37-38; Smith, supra note 4, at 210-13. The fixed
costs in the capacity payments generally consist of construction, maintenance, and
fixed fuel costs, as well as financing and insurance. Beardsworth, supra note 5, at
31-32.
'3 Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 39; Smith, supra note 4., at 210-13.
Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 39; Smith, supra note 4, at 210-13.
35Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 39; Smith, supra note 4, at 210-13.
Smith, supra note 4, at 198; see Harder, supra note 1, at 36.
Although privatization of infrastructure can take many forms, the most
common forms being considered in South Asia involve a consortium submitting a proposal to finance, design, build and operate the project .... The
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recourse nature of project finance, however, lenders and investors often require credit enhancement before committing capital
to the project.37 Frequently, a guarantee from the host government against political risk will serve this purpose. 8 Multilateral
and regional development financing institutions also provide this
type of credit enhancement to parties that meet specific critena.39 Examples of such institutions include the International
Bank of Reconstruction and Development ("World Bank"), 40 the
41 and
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA),
42
Eximbank).
United States Export Import Bank ("U.S.

II. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH PRIVATE POWER PROJECTS
A. Commercial Risks
A project developer first encounters commercial risk during
the bidding process when the host nation could award the project
to another bidder, the developer could fail to obtain favorable
terms in contract negotiation, or the developer's bid could be
summarily rejected.43 To guard against these risks, the developer must investigate the project's feasibility before submitting
its bid. 44 Important feasibility issues include: 1) the likely customer base of the project; 2) the existence of competitive power
suppliers in the same market in which the developer intends to
operate; 3) the costs of acquiring the project site and the services
typical members of the consortium include a [developer], a contractor, a
technology supplier, an operator, leaders and equity providers (investors).
The consortium may also include a minority equity participation by the
host government.
Harder, supra note 1, at 36.
17 See Peter F. Fitzgerald, Overview of Risks in International
Financing, in
PROJECT FINANCING: BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING
MARKETS 1996, at 11 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
A-734, 1996).
Id. at 14-16.
39 Id. at 15.
40 See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 530 (2d ed.
1995); PHILIP A. STEPHAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW

AND POLICY 249 (1993); Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 15.
41 See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 40, at 531; STEPHAN ET AL., supra note
40,

at 250.
42See STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 252; Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 16.
43See Harder, supra note 1, at 37.
"See id. Developers can obtain funding assistance for feasibility studies from a
number of international sources. See Riedy, supra note 18, at 318 n.3 (describing
sources of feasibility funding assistance).
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necessary for operation, such as fuel supplies, energy distribution networks and communications systems; 4) the availability of
operating licenses and permits from the host nation; 5) the environmental impact of the project; 6) the availability and convertibility of currencies and the impact of foreign exchange controls imposed by the host nation; and 7) the availability of
insurance against both commercial and political risk.45
Once the host nation accepts a developer's bid, the developer
faces a number of additional commercial risks.4 ' These risks include: 1) whether the developer can repatriate profits; 2)
whether the project facility fails to operate properly over the life
of the project; 3) whether the growth of the purchasing utility's
demand for energy ("load growth") is slower than projected during negotiations; 4) whether the purchasing utility is able to
make timely payments for energy purchased; 5) whether the host
nation is able and willing to meet the obligations of its utility; 6)
whether the utility is able to maintain the parts of the energy
distribution network for which it is responsible; and 7) whether
fuel costs will rise beyond the point where the project can be
profitable.47 The host nation and its power utility also face commercial risk after acceptance of the developer's bid. 48 These risks
include: 1) whether project construction is completed in a timely
fashion; 2) whether project development generates cost overruns
or inflated construction costs; 3) whether satisfactory operation
and maintenance procedures are in place; and 4) whether energy
capacity shortfalls occur during project operation.4 9
Commercial risks are addressed and allocated between the
developer and the host nation in the PPA.50 The PPA allocates
these risks using three basic mechanisms: 1) the two-tier pricing
system; 2) a bonus and penalty system; and 3) a requirement
that the developer provide a performance guarantee. 51 As discussed previously, the two-tier pricing system is composed of capacity and energy payments, which represent the host nation's
supra note 1, at 37.
See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 36-37.
Id.; see Harder, supra note 1, at 37-39; Smith, supra note 4, at 220-21.
See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 36-37.
"Id.; see Harder, supra note 1, at 37-39.
o See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 35-36; see also Smith, supra note 4, at 26468 (setting forth key provisions of typical PPA designed to allocate commercial risks
between developer and host nation).
"' See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 37-41; Smith, supra note 4, at 226-27.
4Harder,
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payment obligation for project development and operation. Capacity payments are fixed relative to the project's dependable
energy generation capacity and must be paid by the power utility
whether or not the plant is called upon to deliver power.5 3 Capacity payments are designed to compensate the developer for
fixed costs, including development and construction costs, fixed
operation and maintenance costs, insurance and financing costs,
and return on equity investments." Energy payments, in contrast, vary in relation to the amount of energy the developer actually delivers to the power utility. 5 Energy payments are designed to cover the cost of fuel and the variable operation and
maintenance
costs associated with the actual production of en56
ergy.
The PPA also provides for a system of bonuses and penalties
designed to ensure the developer's performance under the
agreement. Often, bonuses and penalties take the form of adjustments to capacity and energy payments. 5 For example, the
developer can be penalized for construction cost overruns, delayed project completion, and generation capacity shortfalls
during project operation.59 The developer can, however, receive
bonuses for completing construction early or under budget, or for
generating greater capacity than required under the PPA. 60
Finally, the PPA often requires that the developer provide a
performance guarantee in the form of either a performance bond,
corporate guarantee, or letter of credit.6 ' If the developer fails to
perform its obligations under the PPA, the performance guaran52 See

Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 37-39; Smith, supra note 4, at 210-13.

53 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 37-38; Smith, supra note 4, at 210-13.
"[M]onthly capacity payments are generally calculated as the product of capacity
rate multiplied by the dependable capacity for the month .... " Manuel, supra note
14, at 45.
' Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 37-38. See generally, Manuel, supra note 14, at
42-59 (discussing shifting of construction, operating, fuel, market, and political risks
from private developer to public sector utility through calculation of monthly capacity payments under PPA).
" Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 39; Smith, supra note 4, at 210-13.
5' Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 39; see Smith, supra note 4, at 210-13
(distinguishing projects with state-owned fuel sources from projects with privately
owned fuel sources).
", See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 39; Smith, supra note 4, at 211.
Beardsworth, supra note 4, at 39.
Id. at 39-40.
s Id.
"' Id. at 40-42.
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tee may authorize the power utility to suspend capacity payand draw upon the security fund created by the guaranments
62
tee.
Through these contractual risk allocation provisions, the developer and its lenders assume the risk of construction cost overThese risks are apruns and inadequate capacity generation.
propriately borne by the developer because the developer has a
more direct influence upon the details of the plant's operation
and construction and can mit~ate the risk by implementing effective management practices.
Conversely, the power utility and the host nation bear the
risk of factors that are outside of the developer's control.65 These
factors include fuel costs and the actual demand for energy generated by the project facility. 66 The host nation assumes these
risks by making the capacity and energy payments required under the PPA.6 7 These risks are also properly allocated because
to mitigate them through
the host nation is in the best position
6s
policy.
development
economic
its
B. PoliticalRisks
While commercial risks are common to all types of project
financing, extensive political risk is more closely related to pri69
If a private infrastructure projects in developing countries.
62

id.

0 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 35-37 (discussing allocation of commercial
risks); Smith, supra note 4, at 218-21 (same).
6"See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 37; Smith, supra note 4, at 218.
' See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 35-37 (discussing allocation of commercial
risks); Smith, supra note 4, at 218-21 (same).
" See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 39 (discussing energy payments); Smith,
supra note 4, at 210 (same).
67 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 37-39 (discussing two-tier pricing system);
Smith, supra note 4, at 211-13 (same). Under the PPA, capacity payments must be
made by the host nation or the power utility throughout the term of the PPA regardless of whether the developer actually delivers energy to the power utility. See
Smith, supra note 4, at 219. Even if the market demand for power falls below the
level contemplated by the host nation or power utility, the developer receives its intended rate of return. Id.
68 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 37 (examining proper division of risk allocation between developer and host nation); Smith, supra note 4, at 218.
69 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 43 (noting political risks inherent in financing private power projects in developing countries); Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 9
(explaining risks unique to investing in private power projects); Judd L. Kessler, A
World of Risks, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 1, 1993, at 11, 11-12 (discussing political
risks to privatization projects in developing countries occasioned by external debt
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vate power project in a developing country is to succeed, the developer must address and appropriately allocate several types of
political risk.7 °
1. Currency-Related Risks
Currency-related risks include three different types of risk:
inconvertibility risk, transfer risk, and devaluation risk.7 Inconvertibility risk occurs when the host nation experiences severe foreign exchange shortages which lead to either the central
bank's inability to convert local currency into hard currency or
the enactment of a monetary policy which restricts the conversion of local currency into hard currency.72 This risk exists because the power utility typically makes capacity and energy
payments in the host nation's currency, while the developer must
service its debt and pay dividends on equity investment in hard
73
currency. If the developer is unable to convert project revenues
from local to hard currency, it will be unable to service its debt or
provide returns
on equity investment, and the project will, there74
fail.
fore,
Transfer risk represents the possibility that the host nation's central bank will recognize its foreign exchange obligations
to the developer and the developer's lenders and convert project
revenues from local to hard currency on the central bank's books,
but refuse to allow hard currency to be transferred out of the
host nation.7 5 Often, the refusal of a host nation to transfer hard
currency beyond its borders is a prelude to the government's de-

burdens and fiscal deficits).
70 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 43; Smith, supra note 4, at 221.
7' Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 9; see George T. Ellinidis, Foreign Direct Investment in Developing and Newly Liberalized Nations, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 299, 31516 (1995) (discussing expropriation and inconvertibility risks); Beardsworth, supra
note 5, at 43; Smith, supra note 4, at 222 (analyzing currency risks and their effect
on private power projects).
72 "Hard currency" is defined as all major convertible currencies, including the
U.S. dollar, the British pound, the German mark, the Japanese yen, the French
franc, the Swiss franc, the Italian lira, and the Dutch guilder. Smith, supra note 4,
at 191.
"' Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 9; Smith, supra note 4, at 222.
14 Manuel, supra note 14, at 57; see Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 9 (noting
need
to examine closely host nation's foreign exchange reserves prior to commencing negotiation of PPA); see also Riedy, supra note 18, at 335-36 (discussing positive steps
taken by Indian government to reduce currency risk).
7' Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 9.
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fault on, or restructuring of, its foreign exchange obligations.76

Devaluation risk is the risk that the host nation's currency
value will decrease to the extent of impeding the developer's
ability to service its debt.7 7 Typically, devaluation risk is high in
developing countries.78 While devaluation of the host nation's
currency increases project revenues through inflation, devaluation also increases the developer's inconvertibility risk because
the developer will be less able to generate sufficient local currency to service its hard currency debt obligations.79
There are a number of ways in which the developer can either mitigate or shift the burdens of inconvertibility and transfer
risks.8 0 First, the developer may obtain foreign exchange rights
under the laws of the host nation by negotiating for access to
hard currency at free-market rates through the host nation's
central bank. This solution, however, is effective only to the extent that the host nation's legal system is conducive to recovery
by foreign creditors seeking to enforce their contractual rights. 2
Second, the developer should try to obtain preferential foreign
76 Id.

77Id.; Smith, supra note 4, at 222.
78 See

Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 9 ("In developing countries with soft curren-

cies, the likelihood of devaluation is high and the ability to hedge against or insure
the risk is very limited.").
79 Id.

80See Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 316-30 (examining forms of political risk insurance which protect developer from devaluation of host nation's currency);
Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 11 (analyzing methods developers may utilize to shift
devaluation risk to host government); Mark Kantor, Summary of Project Financing
Programs of. U.S. Eximbank, OPIC, JEXIM, ECGD, in PROJECT FINANCING FROM
DOMESTIC TO INTERNATIONAL: BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING MARKETS 1995, at 111 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Hand-

book Series No. A4-4460, 1995); Smith, supra note 4, at 222 (discussing allocation of
currency risk through governmental regulations).
" See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 13 (stressing importance of obtaining currency exchange rights under PPA); Smith, supra note 4, at 222 (same).
2 See Smith, supra note 4, at 222. Project lenders may discover
that the host
nation's laws do not provide the requisite level of protection. The lenders may demand that the transaction be structured in such a way as to shield the lender from
currency risks. John Teolis, Issues in Project Finance, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAw 197, 204 (Robert Pritchard ed., 1996). If the
host nation responds to the lender's concerns by implementing poorly designed reforms, particularly without consulting domestic private sector, the reforms may
weaken the local economy and decrease the host nation's ability to enact subsequent
reform policies designed to entice foreign investment. Douglas Webb, Legal System
Reform & Private Sector Development in Developing Countries, in ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAw 45, 53 (Robert Pritchard ed.,
1996).
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exchange treatment from the host nation. 8 The extent to which
securing these rights will be possible, however, depends upon the
scope and importance of the project to the nation's development. 84 Third, the developer can mitigate inconvertibility and
transfer risk by purchasing derivative instruments such as currency swaps, options, or forward contracts.m Finally, the developer can shift currency risk by obtaining political risk insurance
from multilateral sources such as the MIGA and the International Finance Corporation ("IFC"), s6 or bilateral sources such as
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") and the
U.S. Eximbank.8 7
Devaluation risk, however, is more difficult to shift to political risk insurers. 8 For example, neither MIGA or OPIC insurance protects against devaluation risk.89 Mitigation of this risk
will depend on the extent to which the developer can negotiate
host government support in the form of linking local currency
capacity and energy payments to hard currency values.90 Such
measures are only as effective as the host nation's ability to meet

84

8

See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 14.

Id.

See Smith, supra note 4, at 222 (listing currency swaps and foreign currency

purchases as typical means of mitigating currency risk); Teolis, supra note 82, at
206 (citing hedge agreements as appropriate means of allocating currency risk).
8" See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 35; Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 316-30;
Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 14; Smith, supra note 4, at 223. Two main sources for
multilateral political risk insurance are the World Bank's Extended Co-financing
guarantee program ('ECO") and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency's
("MIGA") insurance program. ECO provides guarantees to commercial lenders as
well as extended maturities to facilitate financing for private projects, while MIGA
provides coverage for specific political risks. Political risk insurance tends to run for
twenty years, but the coverage is usually limited to US $50 million per project. Id.;
see also Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 35 (stressing importance of having political
risk insurance to protect investment); Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 316-30 (analyzing
investment requirements and coverage offered by MIGA, OPIC, and other political
risk insurers); Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 13 (examining multilateral sources for
political risk insurance, including MIGA, multilateral 'B" loans, and World Bank
guarantees).
7 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 35; Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 316-30;
Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 14; Kantor, supra note 80, at 111; Smith, supra note 4,
at 223.
88See Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 315 (noting developers must obtain private insurance in order to allocate devaluation risk successfully); Fitzgerald, supra note 37,
at 14-16 (analyzing differences in coverage offered by multilateral and bilateral political risk insurers).
89Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 14-16.
9'See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 13; Smith, supra note 4, at 222.

37 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 1

its foreign exchange obligations. 91 Developers should, therefore,
balance the economic health and stability of the host nation
92
against potential profits when determining project feasibility.
2. Expropriation Risk
Expropriation risk is the risk that the host nation will nationalize a private power project in a capricious or discriminatory
manner without providing just compensation.
Expropriation
can occur overtly through a governmental act, or more discretely,
through a series of measures designed to decrease project profitability to the point where the developer abandons the project.9
While a government's failure to pay just compensation is a violation of international law, the definition of "just compensation"
has been a point of dispute.9 5 The traditional U.S. definition requires that the compensation be "just, adequate and effective.
This definition, however, is only beginning to emerge as the international norm. 97
The developer can manage expropriation risk by obtaining
political risk insurance from multilateral sources such as the
Asian Development Bank ("ADB") or the IFC, and bilateral
sources such as OPIC. 98 In addition, expropriation risk can be
mitigated by requiring the host nation to create an offshore collateral account containing sufficient hard currency to service the
9'See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing foreign exchange short-

ages).
92

See Harder, supra note 1, at 39.

11 See

Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 314-15 (noting that nationalization of foreignowned property is legal so long as practice is not done in discriminatory manner,
nationalization serves public purpose, and host nation provides just and fair compensation); Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 9-10. While nationalization of foreignowned companies has not been a frequent occurrence since the 1970's, private proj-

ect investors should not underestimate the potential risks posed by nationalization.
See generally Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-NationalizationCycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995)

(analyzing cyclical nature of nationalization and positing that nationalization will
reappear in near future in accordance with cyclical pattern).
'4

Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 9-10.
Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 314-15; Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 9-10.
Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 314-15; Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 9-10.

9' Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 314-15; Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 9-10.

9See Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 316 (stating purpose of insurance programs is
to allocate political risk in order to promote foreign investment in developing countries); Smith, supra note 4, at 222-23 (discussing scope of coverage offered by MIGA
and ECO); see also ADB Joins Ghazi Stampede with $300m Loan, POWER ASIA, Jan.
22, 1996, at 11 (describing ADB funding of hydroelectric project in Pakistan).
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developer's debt in the event of a governmental taking. 99 Finally,
the developer can obtain a written agreement from the host nation which prohibits nationalization. 0 0
3. Risk of Governmental Default on Payment Guarantees
Risk of governmental default on payment guarantees arises
when both the power utility and the host nation are unable or
unwilling to meet the power utility's obligations under the
PPA. 1°1 Sovereign guarantees are typically embodied in the implementation agreement, which is a contract between the developer and the agencies of the host nation authorized to provide
102
guarantees, assurances, and other types of project support.
Host nations often default on guarantees by obstructing convertibility of their currency or by making foreign exchange unavailable. 0 3 To mitigate this risk, the developer should obtain
political risk insurance from multilateral and bilateral sources.104
4. Host Nation's Legal Treatment of Security interests
Since the legal systems of many developing countries may be
unsophisticated and volatile, the ability of developers to obtain
financing can be hampered by poorly developed debtor-creditor
laws in host nations. 0 For example, a host nation may have in
place a system that recognizes security interests, but no regisFitzgerald, supra note 37, at 13.
supra note 14, at 57. Such an agreement could only be enforced in
the host nation. The effectiveness of this agreement, therefore, would depend upon
the presence of an independent judiciary. Id.
10' Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 43 (explaining risk to investment should host
nation default on payment guarantee); see also Dabhol Row, supra note 7, at 3
(discussing threat to Enron project in India by newly elected state government's refusal to honor commitments made by its predecessor and Indian government);
ENRON CORP., 1995 FORM 10Q (Sept. 30, 1995) (same).
'02 Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 43.
'00 Manuel,

103

Id.

1o See Smith, supra note 4, at 222; see also Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 316-30
(describing multilateral and bilateral sources of political risk insurance); Fitzgerald,
supra note 37, at 14-18 (same). See generally supra note 86 and accompanying text
(discussing multilateral risk insurance providers).
'0 See David Flint et al., Constitutionaland Legislative Safeguards for FDI: A
Comparative Review Utilizing Australia and China, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAW 103, 103-04 (Robert Pritchard ed., 1996)
(positing that foreign investors and project lenders will not finance privatization
projects when host country's legal system offers inadequate protection for foreign
investments); Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 11 (noting that underdeveloped legal
systems create uncertainty in minds of external investors).
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tration system which establishes priority among competing security interests.'0° The risk borne by the project lenders in these
situations will be passed on to the developer and, ultimately, the
power utility in the form of increased financing costs and capacity payments. 17 The only way for the developer to mitigate this
risk is to consider the treatment of security interests carefully
when determining project feasibility. 0
5. Risks Associated with the Laws of the Host Nation
Given the underdeveloped nature of the host government's
legal system, developers must decide whether the host nation
has a legal and regulatory system that is conducive to private
power projects. 0 9 The developer must determine whether the
host nation has a stable system of law and an impartial court
system which allow private parties to seek redress against public
entities." ° Moreover, the developer must consider whether the
host nation will take lawful actions that render the project unprofitable."' For example, the host nation may impose import
or excessive taxation,
and export restrictions, price controls,
2
which threaten project profitability."
The host government's control of numerous goods and services critical to project construction and operation compound this
risk. 1 3 Often, in developing countries, state controlled goods and
services include fuel supplies and transportation systems.14 The
necessity of the developer's reliance on government controlled
'" Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 11; see George M. Knapp, InternationalPower
Projects: Making the Business OpportunitiesAchievable, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT

30, 32 (1993) (describing need for foreign investors to understand ability to perfect
or receivables).
security interest in accounts
107 See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 10.
1o8See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing feasibility issues).
109 See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 11 ("The legal systems of most developing
countries continue to be less developed than in industrialized countries and this
leads to uncertainty as to the legal environment the borrower must operate in and
the lender will encounter if it is ever compelled to enforce its rights."); Harder, supra note 1, at 39 ("To attract foreign equity investment, foreign investors must be
satisfied that the host country has an overall legal and regulatory system which is
conducive to foreign investment.").
'10 Harder, supra note 1, at 39.
..See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 16-17; Manuel, supra note 14, at 55.
" See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 16-17; Manuel, supra note 14, at 55.
" See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 16-17; see also Smith, supra note 4, at 204

(discussing impact of fuel costs when fuel source is both state owned and privately
owned).
"" Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 10.
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goods and services enhances the risks associated with the stability and
fairness of the host nation's legal and regulatory sys115
tems.

It is unlikely that the developer can shift this risk to political insurance carriers, because the insurer will have no recourse
against the host nation for lawful actions within its own borders." 6 Mitigation of this risk, therefore, is based primarily on
the developer's risk assessment during the project feasibility investigation." 7 Developers should identify developing countries
with stable legal and regulatory systems and target those countries for project bids."1 The developer should also use favorable
choice of law and forum selection clauses as negotiating tools
with the host nation to obtain favorable offshore dispute resolution procedures" 9 or compensation for risk assumption in the
form of higher capacity payments from the power utility

20

Host

nations can minimize the impact of the legal system risk on project costs by instituting
legal reforms that ensure fair and swift
121
dispute resolution.

6. Risk of Civil Unrest
Political violence in the host nation (including war, insurrection, terrorism, or labor strikes) can interrupt and even terminate a power project's cash flows, preventing the developer
115

Id.

116 Id. at

16-17.

..
7 See supra notes 43-45, 108 and accompanying text (discussing feasibility issues).
...
See, e.g., Riedy, supra note 18, at 325 (describing legal system in India as favorable to foreign investment based on its similarities to British and American systems).
"9 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 47-48 (discussing negotiation for arbitration clauses in PPAs); Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 11 (suggesting that lenders seek
New York or English choice of law clauses and offshore arbitration clauses in loan
agreements, and emphasizing importance of host country adherence to New York
International Convention of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1958); Riedy, supra note 18, at 349 (noting that India is party to New
York International Convention of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards); see also UCH FinancingStalled Over CollateralPledge, POWER ASIA, Sept.
4, 1995, at 12 (discussing delay in closing of power project in Pakistan resulting
from disagreement between local utility, U.S. Eximbank and IFC over choice of law
provisions in project contracts).
m See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 49-51 (comparing potential strategies for
negotiating PPAs).
121 See Harder, supra note 1, at 39 n.23 (advocating inclusion of independent
arbitration provision in PPAs to ensure greater protection for foreign investors).
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from servicing its debt. 12' Because political violence is often
temporary, the developer can mitigate its risk by requiring the
host government to create an offshore collateral account with
sufficient debt service reserves to protect the developer and its
lenders from temporary business interruption.' 3 The developer
can further mitigate this risk by securing adequate physical proFinally, the risk of political
tection for the project facilities.2
MIGA
violence can
125 be shifted to political risk insurers such as
OPIC.
and
C. Force Majeure Risks
Force majeure risk is the risk that a party's performance of
contractual obligations will be rendered impossible by events not
within the performing party's reasonable expectation or control. 2 6 Force majeure events that could halt project construction
or operation include natural and technical disasters and acts of
terrorism or war. 12 Since neither the developer nor the host nation can control this risk, neither party should bear it alone. 128
Force majeure risk can be mitigated through the purchase of
129
which should extend to the
commercial insurance coverage,
construction and operation phases of the project and insure
against both asset loss and business interruption.3 0
III. RISK ALLOCATION AND ACCESS TO FINANCING
A. ProjectFinancing
In developed countries, public utilities seeking to build
power plants can use internal funds and borrow from capital
m2See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 44; Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 314;
Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 10; Harder, supra note 1, at 39.
See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 18; see also Beardsworth, supra note 5, at
44 (suggesting possible risk mitigation technique of requiring continued capacity
payments during periods of political unrest); Manuel, supra note 14, at 58
(suggesting risk mitigation technique of requiring host nation or power purchaser to
purchase facility during period of extended political unrest or war).
'2

See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 18.

See Ellinidis, supra note 71, at 314; Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 18
(discussing coverage under MIGA and OPIC).
'2 See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 45; Smith, supra note 4, at 223.
'2 Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 45.
"2

See id.

r Id.; Smith, supra note 4, at 223.
"30Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 45; Smith, supra note 4, at 223.
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markets because developed countries have strong credit ratings
and stable economic and political systems.18 1 In developing countries, however, construction and operation of power plants has
13 2
become increasingly privatized and financed on a project basis.
The project is developed by a private entity and investors and
lenders seek repayment of principal, interest, and return on equity from the project's cash flows, collateralizing the project's assets to protect against default. 133 Developing countries have begun to privatize infrastructure development because they lack
the capital to fund it publicly.'3 Power plant development is financed on a project basis for two basic reasons: 1) lenders and
investors are unwilling to assume the political risk involved because developing countries have poor credit ratings and unstable
economic and political systems; and 2) lenders and investors are
unable to accurately assess commercial risk because the project
company, typically formed for the sole purpose of the individual
project, has no performance record or credit rating. 135 If the project company defaults on its obligations to lenders or investors,
there is recourse against the project company's assets, but not
against the assets of the developer that formed the project company.3 3 The lender's risk assessment, therefore, focuses on the
commercial, technical, and political risks of the project rather
than the creditworthiness of the power utility and the host nation. 37 For this reason, lenders often require equity contributions to the project company 13from the developer, ranging from
twenty to twenty-five percent. 8
B. Private Sources of Capital
The traditional source of financing for private power projects
in developing countries is commercial lenders. 139 Commercial
lending is often the cheapest form of financing because it is most

"' See Smith, supra note 4, at 207.
132

Id.

133 Id.

'" Harder, supra note 1, at 35; Smith, supra note 4, at 199; see supra note 5,
and accompanying text.
'35See Smith, supra note 4, at 207.
136

Id.

137

138Id.
139 See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 12-13; Harder, supra note 1, at 36; Smith,
supra note 4, at 14.
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senior in terms of repayment priority.' 4° Commercial lenders,
however, may be unwilling to supply capital either entirely, or to
certain phases of development.14 Developers who are unable to
obtain commercial loans may utilize several other potential
sources of capital. 142 First, the developer can issue a private
placement of securities. 143 Second, the developer can offer securities outside the United States and enjoy the exemption to
United States registration embodied in SEC Regulation S.'"

With both private placements and offshore offerings, the devel-

oper can issue either debt or equity instruments. 4 In addition,
the buyer in each of these situations may resell these securities
within the United States without registration if the security
complies with SEC Rule 144A. 146 Rule 144A provides a safe harbor from registration in the United States for resales to
"qualified institutional buyers" of securities that are not of the
same class as securities publicly traded in United States markets. 4 7 Finally, the developer can offer both debt and equity se'40See VICTOR BRUNDY & MARvIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, CASES

136-38 (1987).
Smith, supra note 4, at 15. For example, lenders often require equity investment during the operation phase of a power project but will completely fund the
construction phase. Id.

AND MATERIALS
141 See

1

See Smith, supra note 4, at 15.

3 See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Doran v. Petroleum
Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 375-77 (1991). A private placement is an offer-

ing by an issuer of securities to a limited number of sophisticated investors who
have access to the type of information that must be disclosed in a registration
statement under section five of the Securities Act of 1933. Securities Act of 1933 §
4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994) ("The provisions of section 5 shall not apply to transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.").
1"SEC Regulation S,17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1996). In order to determine
whether the Section 5 registration requirements apply to a given securities transaction, courts weigh four factors: (1) the number of offerees and their relationship to
the issuer and each other; (2) the number of units offered; (3) the size of the offering;
and (4) the public nature of the offering. See Raslton PurinaCo., 346 U.S. at 124-26;
Doran,545 F.2d at 899-900.
"5 See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
'4 SEC Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1996); see RICHARD W. JENNINGS,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1595 (1992).
14717 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3). In order to qualify as a "qualified institutional
buyer," the purchaser must be either:
(i) a registered broker-dealer that owns and invests in a discretionary basis
at least $10 million in securities of issuers not affiliated with the brokerdealer; (ii) an institution of the type enumerated in [Rule 144A] (other than
a bank or savings and loan association) that owns and invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers not affiliated with
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curities to the public in the United States.'" Public offerings,
however, generate onerous and expensive registration requirements under section five of the Securities Act of 1933.149
C. Public Sources of Funding
The inability of a developer to mitigate or shift political risk
will impede its ability to acquire financing. 150 Developers, therefore, often internationalize the risk by co-financing the project
with international agencies that provide credit enhancements to
encourage private investment in developing countries.' 51
1. Multilateral Sources
An important source of financing for Third World development is the World Bank. 152 The World Bank was created in 1944
to promote the reconstruction and economic development of wartorn Europe. 153 Today, the World Bank's purpose is to promote
economic and social progress in developing nations."' Two affiliates of the World Bank group, the IFC and MIGA, provide important financing for the developers of private power projects in
the Third World. The IFC was established in 1956 to assist the
economic development of less developed nations by promoting direct lending and private foreign investment in the private sector
of underdeveloped nations. 155

The IFC protects developers

against inconvertibility, transfer, and expropriation risks by
providing loans in which there is one hundred percent participathe institution or (iii) a bank or a savings and loan meeting the $100 million investment test that also has a net worth of at least $25 million.
Alan K Austin & Gregory M. Priest, Resales of Securities Under Rule 144 and Rule
144A, in SECURITIES FILINGS 1995, at 441, 452 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice

Course Handbook Series No. A4-4493, 1995).
'4' See Smith, supra note 4, at 209.
14 Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §
77e.
150See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
:51 Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 16.
152 See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 40, at 530;
40, at 249.
"' CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 40, at 530.
'a

STEPHAN ET AL., supra note

STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 250. For a discussion of World Bank fi-

nancing of private power projects in developing countries, see World Bank Backs
Private Power Schemes, POWER ASIA, Jan. 22, 1996, at 13 (describing World Bank's
Private Sector infrastructure Development Project which will initially create fund of
$150 to $200 million); WB to Fund Ghazi BarothaPending IMF Talks, POWER ASIA,
Nov. 13, 1995, at 14 (describing World Bank financing of power project in Pakistan).
155CARTER & TRIMBLE, supranote 40, at 531.
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tion by a commercial bank or syndicate of banks. 56 MIGA was
established in 1988 to encourage direct investment in developing
countries.5 7 MIGA insures up to ninety percent of the developer's debt, to a ceiling of fifty million dollars, but only if the developer insures its own equity investment.' 5 In 1995, the World
Bank lent over two hundred and seventy million dollars to South
Asian countries alone for energy projects. 59
2. Bilateral Sources
In addition to the multilateral sources of development financing assistance, many governments of developed countries
provide direct funding. 60 The United States, for example, provides two important credit enhancement programs which facilitate direct investment in developing countries. The first is
OPIC, an independent U.S. government-owned corporation
which insures investments in developing countries. 16' OPIC
provides political risk insurance to U.S. developers and commercial lenders covering one hundred percent of the inconvertibility and transfer currency risks, expropriation risk, and political violence risk. 62 The second, the U.S. Eximbank, provides
support for the sale of domestic goods to foreign purchasers by
163
providing purchase guarantees and political risk insurance.
The U.S. Eximbank provides insurance that covers inconvertibility, transfer, and expropriation risks on similar terms to
OPIC, but the Eximbank can cover foreign lenders ineligible for
6 Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 13. But see Capital Market Push Key to Asian
Project FinanceNeeds, POWER AsIA, Nov. 13, 1995, at 1 (discussing new World Bank
policy that will de-emphasize IFC lending to developers in favor of development
lending at national levels).
117 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 40,
at 531.
'58 Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 13.
" WB Power Lending Up but "Catalyst" Role Sought, POWER ASIA, Oct. 16,
1995, at 5; see also IFC Backs APP IPP, POWER ASIA, June 27, 1994, at 13
(discussing IFC approval of $118 million loan for 235-megawatt power project in
Jegurupadu); IFC Backs Hopewell BOT, POWER ASIA, Feb. 1, 1993, at 16 ($110 million loan for 700-megawatt project in Quezon).
1' STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 252. Examples of such government institutions include the German Finance Company for Investments in Developing Countries ("DEG"), the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan ("OECF"), and the
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation ("NEFCO"). See Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water Infrastructure to Developing Countries in Private Sector Financing, 8
GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 91, 108 n.26 (1995).
161 STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 252.
162 Fitzgerald,
16"

supra note 37, at 13-15.
STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 252.
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OPIC programs. 164
D. The RelationshipBetween Risk and Financing
Financing of private power projects is difficult to obtain un165
less risk is properly mitigated and allocated among the parties.
For example, if completion risk is not properly allocated to and
mitigated by the developer, lenders will be less likely to extend
credit for fear of project failure. 6 6 Similarly, if the host government fails to mitigate currency risk and such risk is not shifted
to political risk insurers, lenders will be unlikely to extend credit
6 7
for fear that the developer will be unable to service its debt.
When determining project feasibility, developers most often
appeal first to commercial lenders to obtain financing. 6 8 If the
lender cannot obtain adequate security and mitigate its exposure
to project risks, financing will be refused.6 9 When commercial
lending is unavailable, the developer may seek to obtain financing through the securities markets, which divide project risks
among a larger number of investors. 7 0 Access to these markets,
however, requires the developer to consider the relative cost of
different types of offerings, as well as the risk tolerance of different classes of investors. 171 In the United States, private placements of debt or equity followed by resale under Rule 144A may
offer the best alternative for developers. Such transactions avoid
the registration costs associated with Section five of the Securities Act of 1933 and require placement of securities with sophis-

'" Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 13-14. For discussion of U.S. Eximbank funding
of private power projects in developing countries, see $50m Exim Loan for U.S.
Power Equipment Sales, POWER ASIA, Feb. 19, 1996, at 15 (discussing financing of
125-megawatt facility in Farouqabad, Pakistan); FinancingCleared for Mission, supra note 10, at 1 (discussing financing of Mission's 1200 megawatt Paiton facility in
Indonesia).
165See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
...
See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 27 (asserting that asset-back lenders seek
risk assurances to secure acceptable risk/return ratio).
167 See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 10.
'"See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
'"Cf STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 266 (positing that guaranteeing adequate security is threshold issue in obtaining commercial financing of development
project).
7o See id. at 287. But see Smith, supra note 4, at 199 (asserting that insufficient
number of publicly financed privatization projects has occurred for public securities
to constitute viable, long-term source of funds).
171 See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
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ticated institutional investors that are better able to bear risk. 172
Public offerings, in contrast, are less appealing to developers because they generate high registration costs and because investors are less willing
to assume risk at rates of return acceptable
173
to the developer.

IV. WAYS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO ATTRACT FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN PRIVATE POWER PROJECTS
Developing nations can attract foreign investment and reduce the cost of financing private power projects by stabilizing
their economic, political, and legal environments. 4 First, a de1 75
veloping nation must stabilize exchange rates and inflation.
While there has been significant criticism of the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank structural adjustment programs designed to achieve this end,176 it cannot be denied that
stable exchange rates and measures designed to control inflation
facilitate access to financing for infrastructure development projects in developing countries.177 Second, a developing nation can
172 See

supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.

173

See STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 288; Smith, supra note 4, at 200.

174

Harder, supra note 1, at 39; Smith, supra note 4, at 199.

175 Id.

176See Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the InternationalTrade Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 371 (1994).
The term structural adjustment refers to the process by which economic
factors such as land, labor and capital are reallocated within a country as it
adapts in order to function more efficiently as part of the global economy.
Structural adjustment is required by the liberalization of international
trade as each country moves to specialize in the production of those goods
which it can produce most efficiently, and abandons the production of those
goods which it cannot produce as efficiently. Because the process usually
entails unemployment, the closing of inefficient industries, and other such
dislocations in the short run, this adjustment tends to be politically sensitive in all countries.
Id.; see, e.g., Caroline S. West, Effects of the New World Order on the Third World,
87 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 37, 50 (1993) (arguing that while structural adjustment
programs in Africa stemmed inflation and brought currencies more in line with
market values, such programs failed to encourage economic diversification); Shelley
Wright, Women and the Global Economic Order:A Feminist Perspective, 10 AM. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 861, 881 (1995) (arguing that structural adjustment programs
cause currency devaluation and inflation which have particularly severe impact on
women).
...
See Smith, supra note 4, at 195 (asserting that stability of host nation's
macroeconomic environment is requisite to success of privatization projects);
MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 420 (4th ed.
1989) (positing that private lenders construe economic stabilization measures as
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ensure a climate conducive to foreign investment by developing7 a8
political consensus in support of infrastructure privatization.
Political consensus will reduce the political risks perceived by
foreign developers and lenders.17 9 Third, host nations should focus on the development of legal systems that are predictable and
fair.' s° Legal reform should focus on issues that affect the promotion of foreign investment, such as the effectiveness of debtorcreditor laws regarding the protection of the priority of security

interests. 8

Legal reform should also focus on streamlining dis-

pute resolution procedures, either through legislative reform or
through a willingness to submit to binding arbitration under
project contracts. 82 Finally, host nations should institute regulatory reform that encourages the submission of competitive bids
from foreign power developers.' By instituting an efficient and
predictable regulatory framework, host nations will encourage
bid submission by reducing the costs to bidders.' M Moreover, by
accepting bids in a competitive environment, host nations can
reduce their liability
for project costs by enhancing their bargain85
ing positions.
V. THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF RISK REDUCTION
Host nations must also consider the social impact of adoptproviding greater assurance of host nation's ability to repay debt).
178 Smith, supra note
4, at 195.
179 Id.

"" Id.; see also Harder, supra note 1, at 39 (discussing importance of private investor's confidence in host country's legal and economic systems).
"' See Fitzgerald, supra note 37, at 21 (discussing laws governing debtorcreditor relationships and security interests in developing countries); Smith, supra
note 4, at 196 (detailing fundamental elements necessary for legal reform).
"' See Beardsworth, supra note 5, at 35 (suggesting that developers and power
utilities form "operating committees" as front-line dispute resolution mechanism to
be used before submission of disputes to binding arbitration); Smith, supra note 4,
at 196; see also Riedy, supra note 18, at 330 (describing legal system of India as
relatively conducive to foreign investment given its similarities to British and
American systems).
'
See Smith, supra note 4, at 197 (stating that absence of regulations can prolong project negotiation).
' See id. (stating that bid submission regulatory scheme should be open and
transparent).
See Harder, supra note 1, at 40 (questioning whether unsolicited bids by private power developers will achieve optimal technical and financial proposals absent
competing bids); Smith, supra note 4, at 216 ("It is preferable to select developers of
private power projects based on competitive solicitations, since these are more likely
to lead to least-cost [power] supply.").
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ing mechanisms designed to attract foreign investment. 8 6 Economic, political, and legal stabilization can require subordinating
the rights of the host nation's citizens to those of the foreign developers. For example, the stabilization of exchange rates and
inflation is often achieved by reducing wage increases and public
spending.1 8 7 The host nation, therefore, may be forced to decrease government spending which supports programs designed
to help its citizens, including education, health care, social assistance, and poverty relief.188
In addition, economic modernization often..• comes
..
189at the exForging
pense of political pluralism and citizen participation.
a political consensus, therefore, can lead to human rights
abuses.' 9° In developing nations, consensus is often the view of
the political elite, rather than the result of a democratic process. 91 Developing nations often promote economic growth and
industrial development while ignoring human needs. 192 In addition, true political consensus is difficult to obtain because the
power project often sparks the controversy. 193 In some cases,
18

Brian B.A. McAllister, Note, The United Nations Conference on Environment

and Development: An Opportunity to Forge a New Unity in the Work of the World
Bank Among Human Rights, the Environment, and Sustainable Development, 16
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 689, 693 (1993) (citing Global Consultation on the
Right to Development as a Human Right's conclusion that development strategies
which evaluate only financial considerations have resulted in infringement of human rights and led to breakdown of families and communities). Multilateral organizations often fail to consider such costs. The World Bank's charter, for example,
specifically states that all non-economic factors are to be disregarded during loan
negotiations. Id. at 706.
197 Wright, supra note 176, at 881-82. Ironically, stabilization of
foreign exchange rates is often achieved by devaluating the local currency, a mechanism
which often creates inflation. Devaluation further necessitates inflation fighting
measures, such as decreased government spending and wage control. See TODARO,
supra note 177, at 420.
'" Id.; see also West, supra note 176, at 50 (discussing outcome of measures designed to stabilize inflation and foreign exchange).
1
Robert Weissman, 'Development" and the Denial of Human Rights in Ramos'
Philippines,7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 251, 252 (1994).
1 Id.
at 268 n.4 (positing that state democracy and human rights are often in
competition with goals of economic development).
1 Id. Some commentators, however, believe that, at least in the early stages of
modernization, lack of participation is better than "too much democracy too soon"
because the latter affords narrow interest groups the opportunity to control the development agenda. Id.
'
See McAllister, supra note 186, at 699.
1
Id. at 699. The failure of the host government to assess properly the social
costs inherent in facilitating privatization project financing can lead to disastrous
results. Construction of the Volta Hydroelectric Dam in Ghana, for example, re-
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"consensus" is reached through military repression and human
rights violations. 94 Political consensus attained through military repression may thus lead to the political instability that
foreign investors fear.
Legal reform can also create dilemmas for the host nation.
Non-market oriented economies of less developed nations often
have trouble interjecting concepts of business law created in
market oriented economies.' 95 Business laws of developed nations rely upon a stable and honest bureaucracy to balance fairly
196
Such institutions do not necespublic and private interests.
sarily exist in less developed nations, with bureaucrats free to
over public and private assets for political and
exercise control
197
personal gain.
The host nation must also be aware of the social impact of
promoting competitive bidding. True competitive bidding requires the elimination of subsidies to state-run utilities in order
to make non-subsidized private power bids competitive. 19 Terminating subsidization of utility service leads to opposition from
consumers and may further jeopardize political stabilsubsidized
199
ity.
CONCLUSION

The success of private power projects in developing countries
depends on the ability of both the host nation and the developer
to mitigate and allocate risk appropriately. Generally, commercial risk should be borne by the developer because the developer
is in the best position to control construction and operation of a
private power project. The host nation can reduce its exposure
to the portion of commercial risk that it assumed by instituting
an effective regulatory system for the submission of competitive
project bids. The host nation should bear the greatest degree of
political risk because it is in the best position to do so. Developers can mitigate political risk only by initiating projects in countries where such risk is relatively low and by shifting the risk to
sulted in the involuntary resettlement of 78,000 people, most of whom ended up in
shantytown poverty. Id. at 691-92.
'" See id.

Webb, supra note 82, at 55.
1TId. at 56.
197 id.

'

Smith, supra note 4, at 195.
Id.
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political risk insurers.
Before implementing mechanisms designed to facilitate infrastructure investment, the host nation must carefully consider
the socio-economic costs of these measures. The promotion of
economic growth through foreign investment often requires the
host nation to subordinate the rights of its own citizens. Development strategies which fail to recognize the social impact of
regulations enacted to promote foreign investment may result in
the infringement of human rights and promote civil unrest. The
host nation must therefore consider whether it can succeed in attracting foreign investment without imposing social costs which
outweigh the benefits of such investments.
Poor risk allocation will certainly increase financing costs
and possibly prevent access to financing altogether. The significance of this result is implicit in what is at stake. Developing
countries are pursuing modernization and industrialization with
increasing vigor. Yet, these countries lack the infrastructure to
accommodate modernization. Moreover, they lack the public
funding to finance infrastructure development. The resulting
need for infrastructure development generally, and for energy infrastructure development in particular, has lead developing
countries to seek private sources of capital. Privatization projects should be viewed as more than simply a solution to shortterm budgetary constraints. The success of private infrastructure development depends on proper risk allocation, including
the social risks that arise when a nation privatizes enterprises
that deliver services regarded as necessary for the survival of the
host nation's citizens.

